The Controversy of Ultra-Orthodox Draft Deferments

by Rabbi Alan Silverstein, PhD | President of Mercaz Olami (Representing the global Masorti/Conservative movement)

With the withdrawal of the British mandatory authorities, the State of Israel emerged in 1947-49 into a military conflict, its War of Independence. In a battle for survival, able-bodied Jews were expected to serve in self-defense of the new country. In addition to military considerations, the unfolding Zionist infrastructure had to demonstrate its ability to unify a fragmented Jewish community. As noted by Daniel Gordis, “In 1947, hoping to avoid a split with the ultra-Orthodox on the eve of Israel’s creation, when he could least afford internal discord that might convince the international community that the Jews were not yet ready to govern themselves, Ben-Gurion agreed to what is now called the ‘status quo arrangement.’”

Concessions to the Haredim included a draft deferment for 400 exceptional full-time yeshiva students. The Haredi perspective was premised upon the destruction of European yeshivot and the murder of an entire generation of religious luminaries by the Nazis. Nurturing future scholars, they argued, was necessary to replenish the Torah scholarship that had been destroyed in the Holocaust. Ben-Gurion was persuaded that leniencies were justified in obtaining support for statehood; he assumed that ultra-Orthodoxy was a dying breed of Judaism that would gradually fade and disappear.

Initially, the cap of 400 draft exemptions remained stable. Over time, it increased only modestly to 800. But in 1977 a dramatic expansion took place when Menachem Begin’s Herut party surprisingly received the largest share of Knesset votes. Begin was given the opportunity to form a coalition government. He needed to court the alliance of the Ashkenazi “Agudah” Haredi party. The courtship required increasing subsidies for Agudah schools — and removing the upper limit of 800 draft exemptions.

These concessions spawned a massive increase in both Agudah students and deferments. This Ashkenazi achievement incentivized the Sephardi/Mizrachi Haredim to pursue similar benefits and led to the creation of the Sephardi Shas party in 1984. By the time of Israel’s war with Hamas in the wake of the October 7, 2023, attack, Haredi — both Ashkenazi and Sephardi — draft exemptions numbered 63,000. This huge figure accounted for 13 percent of draft-eligible Israeli Jewish males. Post-October 7, as military pressures mounted in Gaza, the West Bank, Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, and Iran, as well as Iranian surrogate outposts in Syria and Iraq, the IDF faced a manpower shortage.

Of necessity, the Knesset increased the age for “calling up” reservists. It also expanded the duration of service required of new inductees. As threats mounted for Jewish Israelis, the fact of the 63,000 exempt Haredim intensified the feeling of resentment among non-Haredi Israelis. Why shouldn’t the ultra-Orthodox take part in Israel’s self-defense during such a critical and dangerous period? What about the thousands of so-called “Lost Boys,” deferred Haredim who are not full-time students? An Israel Democracy Institute survey indicates that at least 22 percent of allegedly full-time Haredi yeshiva students are illegally employed, in violation of the terms of their exemption.

Feeling mounting societal pressure, Israel’s High Court recently ruled against sustaining automatic exemptions for all Haredi males. Instead, in addition to the current group of 1,800 Haredi soldiers, the court ordered a 3,000-man gradual increment annually in such draft notices. Intensified societal debate ensued.

In defense of Haredi exemptions were voices like Avi Shafran of Agudath Israel of America. Shafran wrote:

“Haredim believe … that the religious devotion in the form of Torah study, no less than the actions of foot soldiers or intelligence officers, is important to Israel’s security. … The Talmud, for example, states (Sanhedrin 49a) that ‘if it weren’t for King David’s Torah study, his military commander Yoav would not have succeeded in war, and if not for Yoav’s efforts in battle, David would not have been able to learn Torah.’” For this reason, Shafran insists, that with “the Haredi insistence on preserving a sizable cadre of men engaged in full-time dedication to Torah study, … those dedicated Jews are not evading public service but contributing to it. … They sincerely believe [it] is essential to the safety and security of all their fellow Jews.”

Additionally relevant is that Haredi units within the IDF slowly have been increasing — 730 Haredi soldiers in 2009, 1,185 in 2021, 1,800 in 2024, with hundreds of others volunteering for duty post-October 7. Simultaneously, ultra-Orthodox parental opposition to their sons going into IDF service intensified. Consequently, a sizable percentage of Haredi soldiers de facto became “Lone Soldiers,” even though their relatives are Israelis. They now comprise a sizable portion of IDF enlistees turning to the Michael Levin Lone Soldier Centers and base for support.

Journalist Liel Leibovitz has elaborated upon practical obstacles to Haredi integration into the IDF. He reminds readers that soon after October 7, as many as 4,000 Haredi young men had volunteered to enter the IDF; however, 3,120 were “deemed … unfit to serve, mostly for being too physically weak to fight.” And among the remaining 880 Haredi volunteers, only 540 were officially accepted by the IDF — 13.5 percent of the initial 4,000. Liel attributes the IDF’s reluctant welcome to its realization that “fully integrating Haredim into its ranks would require …. providing [Haredi standards of] strictly kosher food [and] addressing concerns rising from co-ed military service.” Commentator Susan Greene added that IDF resistance to change suited the Haredi leadership’s desire “to keep Haredi young men cloistered in their communities, without exposure to Israel’s mixed-gender army or … the temptation to leave Haredi life after serving.”

As a rebuttal to the claim that Jewish texts oppose Haredi military service, Rabbi David Golinkin contextualizes the talmudic statement in Sotah 21a, that “only the Torah protects the people of Israel.” Rashi explains that while Torah study does “protect from suffering [emotional distress] and saves from the evil inclination,” the Torah “does not protect against bullets, missiles, and bombs.” “Aggadic” (sermonic) talmudic sections were not intended to be taken literally. They certainly did not have the force of Jewish law. Instead, Halacha favors “doing one’s part” in the defense of the nation. Moreover, Golinkin laments that “63,000 Haredi yeshiva students not serving in the IDF constitutes a massive Hillul Hashem” — a desecration of the God-revering life-style. Accordingly, “many secular Jews have distanced themselves from Judaism as a direct result of the exemption.”

“Times of Israel” editor David Horovitz added a historical context: “In contrast to centuries of Orthodox Jewish tradition, and in contrast to the abiding norm in Jewish communities around the world, only in Israel, and only in the past half-century, has full-time Torah study for the young male Haredi masses become the norm … in exchange for alliances” and enabled by funding from political factions in the Knesset. Haredi leaders insist “that their publics must not share in the practical burden of the defense of our homeland, indeed must not perform any form of national service.…” In this way, Horovitz writes, “universal draft exemptions are “undermining the other millennia-old Orthodox tradition in which the very best and brightest of scholars are subsidized by the rest of the community.…”

In addition to the military’s need for additional manpower, Israel’s economy is challenged by the growth of a population ineligible for post-army employment benefits. In conjunction with the growth in military spending, Israel’s national budget is stressed by ever expanding government subsidies to support the Haredim. Why? Nearly half of Haredi families live below the poverty line. The Israel Democracy Institute estimates that their welfare costs have grown to $2.6 billion annually. Additionally, Haredi adult yeshivot (kollels) receive $1.7 billion in national subsidies. As Haredi birthrates continue to grow, the numbers exceed 6.5 children per household. While most Haredi women do work outside the home, almost 50 percent of Haredi men study Torah in lieu of earning a living. Even those who do work often do so only part-time. Haredi IDF service and post-army employment benefits would offer a partial remedy that can no longer be ignored.

On the optimistic side of the ledger, a Smith Consulting poll presented to the Knesset revealed that although 72 percent of the ultra-Orthodox oppose their ranks being subject to the draft, 59 percent “indicated — to one degree or another — that the creation of [IDF special] service tracks that would allow them to maintain their lifestyle would have a beneficial effect on overall enlistment numbers.” Even if the impact of unique Haredi units would be modest, it would help repair the growing rift between Haredim and the other Jewish sectors of Israeli society. For reasons of IDF manpower, Israel’s taxed economy, and a sense of injustice felt by non-Haredi Israelis, it is more urgent than ever to find a solution.

About the Author

Rabbi Alan Silverstein, PhD, was religious leader of Congregation Agudath Israel in Caldwell, NJ, for more than four decades, retiring in 2021. He served as president of the Rabbinical Assembly, the international association of Conservative rabbis (1993-95); as president of the World Council of Conservative/Masorti Synagogues (2000-05); and as chair of the Foundation for Masorti Judaism in Israel (2010-14). He currently serves as president of Mercaz Olami, representing the world Masorti/Conservative movement. He is the author of “It All Begins with a Date: Jewish Concerns about Interdating,” “Preserving Jewishness in Your Family: After Intermarriage Has Occurred,” and “Alternatives to Assimilation: The Response of Reform Judaism to American Culture, 1840-1930.”