by Rabbi Alan Silverstein, PhD | President of Mercaz Olami (Representing the global Masorti/Conservative movement)
The Jewish tradition advocates hakarat hatov — displaying gratitude to people who have engaged in acts of goodness toward Jewry. With the passing of former President Jimmy Carter, extensive expressions of “thank you” have been verbalized by Jewish leaders. They acknowledge Carter’s pivotal role in hosting 12 days (September 5-17, 1978) of successful negotiations at Camp David, with subsequent Carter-led diplomacy yielding a historic peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.
As noted by diplomat Dennis Ross: “He [Carter] is the hero of Camp David, and the agreements would never have emerged without him. He played the role of mediator, often explaining each to the other. He literally drafted the Egyptian-Israeli part of the accords and held the summit together at the moments when it might otherwise have collapsed.”
Yet Judaism also demands emet — honesty in evaluating the behavior of others toward Jewry. Despite his heroism at Camp David, Carter’s record as a Middle East peacemaker is filled with numerous problematic efforts against the diplomacy conducted by the Jewish State and even against the bilateral-Begin efforts toward peace.
Carter’s peace plan’s bias against Israel
Carter entered the presidency determined to impose a peace plan to force Israel into an international Geneva Peace conference charged with crafting a comprehensive settlement between Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Israel’s Prime Minister in the initial portion of the Carter Era was not Menachem Begin of Likud but Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party. As noted by the advisor to a sequence of Prime Ministers, Yehuda Avner, “Rabin abhorred the [Carter] idea of an international peace conference. It would mean facing [anti-Israel] Russia as co-chairman with the [Carter-led] U.S., along with a solid bloc of hostile Arab states, backed by Moscow and the non-aligned nations, all intent on enfeebling Israel — a sure prescription for failure, if not outright war… There was more: President Carter wanted not only Geneva; he wanted to know how the PLO, led by Yaser Arafat, would fit into the whole negotiation process.”
Rabin had assumed that the Carter administration would allow the US approach of the past decade (under Nixon and Ford) to remain in effect: This would mean reliance upon direct negotiations by Israel separately with Egypt, Jordan, and then Syria. It meant no concessions to Palestinian demands for a “homeland” until the PLO officially accepted Israel’s right to exist. Plus, it meant insistence upon “defensible borders” as envisioned by UN Resolution 242, not demanding the return to the vulnerable cease-fire lines of 1948-9. Yet, at a press conference following his initial meeting with Rabin, Jimmy Carter went public with contrary views. This was a tactic to pressure the Jewish State. In his notes, Prime Minister Rabin commented:
“I was given reassurances from the President that the contents of our [often confrontational] conversations would under no circumstances be allowed to leak out or be publicized in any manner. I was, therefore, all the more surprised to hear the President’s far-reaching statements at a press conference the very next day… His remark on Israel’s withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines, with minor modifications, was the worst part of it. No President before him had ever committed the United States to such a position… [Plus] only ten days later, Carter would speak of the need for a “Palestinian homeland,” a further dramatic change in traditional US policy.”
It was to be no surprise that Rabin’s more hawkish successor as Prime Minister, Menachem Begin of Likud, was at odds with the “Carter Plan.” Less obvious was that Egypt’s Anwar Sadat would join with Begin in opposing the Carter approach. Yehuda Avner recalls:
“It is clear that Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat had an instinctive sense of global geopolitics that told them that such a conference would place Soviet Russia squarely back into the heart of the Middle East equation. The Egyptian President had kicked the Russians out, and he was not about to slip under their thumb again. This led him to conclude that it was infinitely better to implement a bilateral peace with Israel rather than again become a mere pawn in the superpower Middle East play. Begin wholeheartedly agreed.”
Accordingly, Egypt and Israel commenced a back-channel bilateral negotiation format, bypassing the meddling of President Carter. Yehuda Avner records that: “Begin’s instincts [for secret diplomacy] had been greatly energized by reports from Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who had secretly met with a senior Sadat confidant in Morocco some months before, and from whom he had learned that ‘the Soviets would not play any positive or constructive role in future negotiations.’ At that same time, Begin himself had visited Bucharest to impress upon the Sadat confidant, the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, Begin’s desire to come to terms with Egypt [and this was relayed to Sadat]. “Having put out these feelers, the Israeli premier was not taken entirely by surprise when the Egyptian President resolved… To circumvent Geneva [Carter’s approach] by flying to Israel to talk peace.”
Insider Yossi Alpher, later a senior advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Director of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, revealed that at first, Carter was not pleased with Sadat’s planned visit to Jerusalem and the Knesset: “When Sadat announced he was going to Jerusalem, the Carter administration understood the move as yet another attempt, this time by an Arab leader, to scuttle its scheme to bring everyone together in Geneva…” Columnist Jeff Dunetz added his assessment that “Not only did Egypt and Israel reject Carter’s internationalization of the process, but Sadat wanted to ease away from the Egyptian-Russian alliance and build a stronger relationship with the US.”
Nevertheless, Sadat and Begin conducted reciprocal visits to Jerusalem, Ismailia, and Egypt, along with a joint press conference. They announced the “Solemn pledge…That there will be no more wars between us.” In the presence of visiting UJA leaders, Begin made a phone call to update Jimmy Carter. To the surprise of the assembled, with a smile, Begin stated, “Mr. President, without you, it could never have happened.”
After the call had ended, Gordon Zacks (one of the UJA delegation) asked the Prime Minister, “Why give Carter so much credit? Sadat came here because of what you did and despite what Carter did, with his idea of Geneva with the Soviets.” Begin responded wisely, “Giving him a bit of credit now might help us a little in the future.” Menachem Begin’s instincts proved true at Camp David during 12 difficult days of negotiations, led reluctantly, albeit effectively, by President Carter.
Jeff Dunetz continued his report, “[Sadat and Begin] wanted the peace negotiations to start right away…. But Carter said no…. He wanted his Geneva talks. He didn’t care that the nascent process begun by Sadat and Begin might lead to peace. Carter wanted his plan or nothing. But thankfully, Carter couldn’t stop the approaching peace train. Within days, Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo… From there, the peace process gained momentum. Sixteen months later, there was a treaty-signing ceremony at the White House.”
Carter: A “hero” at Camp David with a mixed record as an Egypt-Israel peacemaker
Dunetz concluded that “Carter — who had done his very best to screw up what would eventually become the only foreign policy success of his presidency — was instrumental in keeping the talks going [at Camp David]. The peace treaty, which was signed on March 26, 1979, wouldn’t have happened without him.”
Yes, Jimmy Carter was “the hero” at the Camp David stage of events. However, he earned a mixed record in terms of being an Egypt-Israel peacemaker.
Rabbi Alan Silverstein, PhD, was religious leader of Congregation Agudath Israel in Caldwell, NJ, for more than four decades, retiring in 2021. He served as president of the Rabbinical Assembly, the international association of Conservative rabbis (1993-95); as president of the World Council of Conservative/Masorti Synagogues (2000-05); and as chair of the Foundation for Masorti Judaism in Israel (2010-14). He currently serves as president of Mercaz Olami, representing the world Masorti/Conservative movement. He is the author of “It All Begins with a Date: Jewish Concerns about Interdating,” “Preserving Jewishness in Your Family: After Intermarriage Has Occurred,” and “Alternatives to Assimilation: The Response of Reform Judaism to American Culture, 1840-1930.”